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Abstract 
 
This paper compares the gains from multilateral and regional trade liberalization in 
context of poverty reduction—whether multilateral liberalisation can be more successful 
in reducing poverty in Uganda than regionalism. Using a Computable General Equilibrium 
(CGE) framework and benchmark data from Uganda national household survey, the results show 
that poverty falls in all cases (under multilateral liberalisation and different regional integration 
arrangements), and but poverty falls much more under multilateral trade liberalisation.  
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1 INTRODUCTION  
 
 
Uganda is widely known for implementing rigorous economic reforms in the 1980s–1990s, in 
which trade liberalization was part. Export taxes were removed and import tariffs rates reduced. 
Control of domestic prices by government ended, and state-controlled enterprises were privatized 
to reduce government’s involvement in commercial activities. On 30 November 1999 the Treaty 
Establishing the East African Community (EAC) was signed, bringing the number of regional 
agreements to which Uganda is a member, to two after COMESA (established in November 
1993). Since then, regional integration programmes (EAC, COMESA), continue to drive trade 
policies process in Uganda.  
This new policy orientation is evidenced by a marked increase in Uganda’s exports from US$ 
196 million in 1991 to US$ 1.34 billion in 2007, while imports rose from US$ 1.73 billion in 
2004 to US$ 3. 5 billion in 2007.  This in turn has generated a new optimism about Uganda’s 
potential for accelerating economic growth and for reducing poverty. In 1992 (after five years of 
implementing new trade policies), there was a widespread poverty incidence (of over 50 percent) 
all across Uganda. Over 70 percent of the population in northern Uganda lived below the poverty 
line (Appleton, 1999). This result was confirmed by the census-based results, which also 
demonstrated that the central and western region had the lowest levels of poverty (54 percent) 
compared with other regions. When other measures of welfare: poverty gap and Gini coefficient 
are considered, the northern Uganda had worsening indices of inequality and poverty gap in the 
early 1990s.  
By 1999/2000, national poverty headcount had declined to 35 percent from 56 percent in 1992 
(Appleton, 1999; UBOS, 2003a). Over the same period, total trade increased by 95 percent: from 
US$ 695.8 million in 1992 to US$ 1.36 billion in 2000. The gains in incomes through increased 
producer prices of cash crops particularly coffee in the 1990s contributed to reducing poverty in 
1992 and 2000. Poverty declined throughout western, central and eastern Uganda, where coffee 
is widely grown. In northern Uganda where agricultural production was interrupted by effect of 
war, poverty level remained high (Appleton, 1999; UBOS, 2003).  
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However, in 2003, poverty rose to 38 percent despite the 40.4 percent increase in total trade 
between 2000 and 2003.  Income inequality (measured by Gini coefficient) also rose from less 
than 0.39 in 1999/2000 to 0.43 in 2002/03, and continues to widen both in rural and urban areas. 
Similarly, the depth of poverty (measured by the poverty gap index – the ratio of the average 
extra consumption required to bring all poor people up to the poverty line) worsened. Poverty 
gap rose from Ushs 711,592 million (€355 million) in 1992 to Ushs 581,907 million in 1996 and 
about Ush 1,200 billions (€571 million: approx. 10% of Uganda’s GDP) in 2002/03.  
Recent statistics suggest that since 2003 poverty levels have reduced remarkably, but these 
official figures were subjected to searching criticism from politicians and academics who argue 
that it was inconceivable to talk about fall in poverty amongst a population that was surviving on 
food relief (referring to northern Uganda).1  
Against this background, the aim of this paper is to compare the gains from multilateral and 
regional trade liberalization in context of poverty reduction—whether multilateral liberalisation 
can be more successful in reducing poverty than regional integration. The paper helps us to 
understand, to what extent, Uganda’s trade liberalization in the context of EAC and COMESA 
trading arrangements (Uganda becoming a member of COMESA free trade area), and ROW are 
likely to impact on the poor. What impact is the reduction/removal of tariffs on Uganda’s 
imports from the EAC and COMESA trade (the non-EAC COMESA countries) is likely to exert 
on the level of poverty in Uganda?  The second part of this question facilitates the understanding 
of what would be the benefits of the actual vis-à-vis contemplated options with regards to 
Uganda’s membership in COMESA.  
This paper adds some new dimension to the understanding of the effects of trade policies on 
poverty by going beyond the traditional fashion of modelling the relationship between trade and 
poverty, to actually distinguishing the impact of policies at national, regional and multilateral 
level presenting policymakers with potentially interesting choices and options to consider.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in section 2, trade policies developments in 
Uganda are presented. In section 3 is an overview of the CGE micro simulation approach used in 
trade and poverty analysis. Section 4 introduces the model, combined with a theoretical 
                                                 
1 A household that appears not to be poor according to the standard national poverty line could actually be poor if a 
poverty line based on the (high) cost of living in her region were used instead (Okurut et al 2002). 
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framework linking trade, and poverty. The empirical results are presented in section 5 and 
section 6 concludes.  
2 UGANDA’S TRADE LIBERALISATION  
 
This section gives a brief account of the trade policy developments in Uganda. It maps out 
Uganda’s trade relationships in the East African Community (EAC), the Common Market for 
Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and with the 
European Union (EU). Distinguishing between these markets, in which Uganda’s trade faces 
different conditions, with implications for poverty, it presents policymakers with potentially 
interesting choices and options to consider.        
 
2.1 Unilateral trade reforms  
 
Unilaterally, Uganda has implemented a series of trade reforms in a process that started in the 
late-1980s as part of structural adjustment programmes (SAP) with support mainly from the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. These programmes, anchored in economic 
liberalisation led to (i) privatisation of state-owned enterprises, encouraging greater participation 
by the private sector; (ii) removal of domestic price control and subsidies that were used 
extensively since 1960s to protect agricultural sector; (iii) reduction of tariffs on imports (from 
average of 40 percent to 30 percent) and removal of export taxes; and (iv) simplification of 
customs procedures.  
Between the late-1980s to early 1990s, all state-owned agricultural marketing companies, 
notably, Produce Marketing Board (PMB), Lint Marketing Board (LMB), and Coffee Marketing 
Board (CMB), which for over 25 years held the monopoly on the purchase and export of 
agricultural commodities, were disbanded. Encouraged by the rise in farm share of export prices 
for cash crops in the 1990s, and improved economic performance, Uganda sought to build 
dynamic export sectors by reforming its overall tax system and exchange regime.2  
                                                 
2 Many argue that, at the time when the CMB was a monopoly in coffee export, farmers’ share of the export price 
was less than 30 percent. This share rose to 82 percent in 1996/97 from 45% in 1991/92 (as unit export price for 
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On border taxes, the myriad tax rates charged on imports were reduced to five bands in 
1990/91 and eventually, to three standard rates: 0%, 7% and 15% under plant and machinery 
(capital goods), raw materials and intermediate goods, and finished goods, respectively. Tariff 
peaks were reduced from over 40 percent – to average of 10-30 percent range for most tariff 
lines as summarised in Table 1 for the year 2004 and 2005.  
 
Table 1. Uganda: Import-weighted and simple average tariffs, 2004 and 2005  
 
  Simple average Import-weighted 
 2004 2005 2004 2005 
Food and live animals 18.0 24.3 13.3 29.0 
Beverages and tobacco 86.3 25.2 69.7 25.0 
Crude materials, inedible 10.3 4.4 20.1 32.6 
Mineral fuels & lubricants 7.1 11.6 0.3 0.7 
Animal and vegetable oils & fats 13.8 12.6 17.3 16.0 
Chemicals and related products 4.7 3.3 4.8 6.2 
Manufactured goods 13.1 16.3 8.5 15.9 
Machinery and equipment 5.5 6.2 7.2 6.0 
Miscellaneous manufactures 13.7 19.0 11.2 15.0 
Others  13.3 18.8 17.0 25.0 
All categories 11.3 12.8 8.8 12.3 
 
Source: World Bank (2006) based on UNCOMTRADE database (for imports) and UNCTAD trains database (for tariffs). 
Note: the 2004 tariffs include excise taxes and import commissions. The data in Table 1 gives the impression that Uganda tariffs 
went up, on average after 2004, which is not the case. This is influenced by high tariffs of a few sensitive tariff lines (sensitive 
products). Readers can have a better picture by looking at ‘all categories’. 
  
The mark–up applied on the value of imports – for sale tax valuation – was reduced and 
eventually eliminated.  The temporary export stabilisation tax on coffee exports was also 
removed. Incentives were targeted at export-oriented sectors to encourage diversification into 
traditional and non-traditional exports.   
Export/import-licensing requirements were replaced (in September 1990) with export/import 
certification system and import controls, with tariff-based protection. Customs formalities have 
been reduced to, essentially, commercial invoice. It is only in exceptional cases that health and 
phyto-sanitary certificates are required. Pre-shipment inspection was largely abolished.   
A market-based inter-bank foreign exchange market (IFEM) system replaced the state-
controlled “window” and auction system of the 1980s, reducing volatility in exchange rates, and 
bias towards traditional export sectors. Traditional export sectors (coffee, cotton, tea and 
tobacco) were allocated foreign exchange through window one, the priority window. “Window 
two”, which majority of traders used had its exchange rate set through weekly auction by Bank 
                                                                                                                                      
Uganda coffee increased 3-fold: from US$ 0.82/kg in 1992 to US$ 2.55/kg in 1994/95) following liberalization of 
the coffee sector in 1991. But how do we attribute this to the policy change. 
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of Uganda. Moreover, exports retention scheme operated under very stringent condition – 
making it difficult for exporters to retain foreign currency to pay for imports.  
By 2004, Uganda was still levying 2 percent import commission on all imports, on top of the 
10 percent excise duty (applied on an ad valorem basis across about 400 tariff lines). In addition, 
17 percent value-added-tax (VAT) was charged on range of imports. Further to these, most of the 
statutory instruments had the flexibility to allow raw materials for specific industries to be 
imported at preferential rates, e.g. remitting the customs duty payable from 15 percent to 7 
percent. Sugar industry could benefit simultaneously from high duties on sugar imports, and 
preferential access to imported sugar as a raw material for other production (beer and soft 
drinks). These preferences were withdrawn prior to the EAC customs unions. The cost of inland 
freight also ceased to be part of the base for valuation of imports.   
 
2.2 Regional dimension of Uganda’s trade policies    
  
2.2.1 Trade policies in the context of EAC integration    
In January 2011, the implementation of the EAC customs union entered its seventh year, having 
come into force on 1st January 2005.3 Since then, the EAC partners have adopted common 
external tariff (CET) to 5,429 tariff lines (at the HS 8-digit level), of which 99.8 percent carry ad 
valorem duties. The CET comprises three bands: 25 percent for finished goods, 10 percent for 
semi-processed or intermediate goods and zero-rate for raw materials and capital goods, except 
for sensitive products. These three rates apply to about 99 percent of overall tariff lines.  
The remaining 1 percent of the overall tariff lines (i.e. 58 tariff lines)—excluded from the 
CET—is for “sensitive products”.  They attract “special tariffs”. About one-fifth of these tariffs 
are combined duties. Ad valorem rates vary from 35 percent duty on matches and battery cells to 
100 per cent duty on sugar imports. Other products on the sensitive list include dairy products; 
wheat; maize; cigarettes; cement; kangu, kikoi, and kitenge fabrics; crown cock; sack and jute 
bags.4   
                                                 
3 Furthermore, a protocol establishing a common market for EAC was signed on 19 November 2009, coming into 
effect on 1 July 2010. It is expected to facilitate movement of persons, labor, and services within the EAC as well as 
a right to establishment and residence of EAC citizens within the community. This in turn is expected to increase 
intra-EAC trade and help facilitate poverty reduction.  
 
4 Annex I to the EAC Customs Union Protocol. 
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Sensitive products constitute important features of EAC tariff structure. In the model, tariffs on 
EAC imports including sensitive products are set to zero (section 5.2) and its impact on level of 
poverty in Uganda, accessed. The data on Table 2 suggests that the five major sensitive products 
account for at least five percent of Uganda’s imports, annually.  
 
Table 2. Share of total imports in 2005 and 2007 of Uganda’s selected sensitive products 
 
 Imports in US$ from Regional 
total (US$)  
As share of 
total imports 
Year 2005  EAC   COMESA   EU   ROW  
Dairy products       377,200            7,903     1,051,239           821,242  2,257,584 0.110 
Maize      862,075                    -        2,691,173        3,126,933  6,680,181 0.325 
Wheat     6,182,536                    -      11,849,131      72,617,542  90,649,209 4.413 
Sugar     9,819,628     4,784,690      1,834,229      12,556,753  28,995,300 1.412 
Cigarettes       817,811     2,957,405           70,178           182,524  4,027,918 0.196 
Year 2007       
Dairy products   4,387,769       121,320      340,144         738,238  5,587,471 0.160 
Maize   61568.43 192.05                 -             50,069  111,829 0.003 
Wheat    3,343,936                 -      3,654,158  102,633,564  109,631,658 3.136 
Sugar  16,262,301  14,329,347       849,853    39,977,836  71,419,337 2.043 
cigarettes   8,999,262          6,215           8,431         236,295  9,250,203 0.265 
 
Source: Author’s calculation, based on Uganda Revenue Authority and Uganda Bureau of Statistics database 
  
Another important feature of EAC tariff structure is the exception for the lesser developed 
members of the EAC including Uganda, who were not expected (at least up to 2010) to fully 
liberalise.5 This exception applies to category “B” goods exports from Kenya to Uganda and 
Tanzania for 443 and 880 tariff lines, respectively.6 These goods attracted 10 percent import duty 
on entry into Uganda and Tanzania in 2005. Beginning 2006, the duty was to be phased out 
progressively, down to zero in 2010. The same applies to the new EAC partners: Burundi and 
Rwanda, whose schedule of accession allows them until 2010 to bring their tariff regimes in 
conformity with the customs union protocol.  
EAC remains an important market for Uganda (Table 3), accounting for a significant share of 
over 21 percent of total exports in 2010. Considering that more than half of these exports 
comprises agricultural products – mainly maize, fish, tea, and vegetables – that employ over 40 
percent of the poor, removing intra-EAC tariffs has the potential to reduce poverty if it results in 
                                                 
5 Article 11 of the Protocol on the Establishment of the East African Community Customs Union. 
6 Category “A” goods from EAC partner states enter into each others’ territory free of customs duty. 
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growth of such sectors. Clearly, potential for expanding Uganda’s exports in the EAC market 
exists as the trends in Table 3 suggest. The structure of imports is also expected to have a 
positive impact on poverty because it covers mainly manufactured goods other than agriculture 
where majority poor are employed.   
 
Table 3. Uganda: distribution of exports and imports, 2005 – 2007 
 
 Trade flow in US$ Trade flow as share of total trade (%) 
Exports to  EAC   COMESA   EU   ROW   EAC  COMESA   EU   ROW  
2005 
     
144,770,947  120,008,348  
 
257,888,739   290,189,113  17.81 14.76 31.73 35.70 
2006 152,829,274  144,666,141  263,751,647   400,946,359  15.88 15.04 27.41 41.67 
2007 274,818,231  262,290,026  324,395,336   475,164,526  20.56 19.62 24.27 35.55 
Imports      
   
 
2005 551,441,415    43,661,964  387,158,238  1,071,875,814  26.85 2.13 18.85 52.18 
2006 430,179,532    48,948,384  481,208,855  1,596,963,298  16.82 1.91 18.82 62.45 
2007 531,060,761    60,059,871  717,641,690  2,186,628,772  15.19 1.72 20.53 62.56 
         
 
 Source: Author’s calculation, based on Uganda Revenue Authority and Uganda Bureau of Statistics database 
 
The downside of EAC tariffs removal is the huge loss in government revenue. Most of these 
losses are expected to come from manufactured imports, textiles, sugar cooking oil, oil seeds, 
dairy products, crude materials and chemical imports (Table A3). For example, tariff revenue 
from manufactured products alone fell by 71 percent between 2005 and 2007 (i.e. from Ush 
308.594 billion to Ush 90.145 billion). As we notice in Table 4, duty revenue on imports from 
EAC declined from Ush 338.5 billion in 2005 to 142.8 billion in 2007. Without temporary 
tariffs, Uganda will lose in aggregate, about 35 percent of total duty revenue.  
 
Table 4. Distribution of Uganda’s tariff revenues by source of imports, 2005 - 2007 
 2005 2006 2007 
Source of imports Tariff revenue in Uganda shillings 
EAC 338,525,324,139 229,065,876,697 142,776,425,255 
COMESA 25,358,887,056 43,593,367,699 27,760,504,647 
EU 105,914,628,717 144,850,933,111 116,443,542,045 
ROW 478,176,061,460 843,974,034,895 654,097,185,448 
Total 947,974,901,372 1,261,484,212,402 941,077,657,395 
 Percentage share of total tariff  revenue 
EAC 35.71 18.16 15.17 
COMESA 2.68 3.46 2.95 
EU 11.17 11.48 12.37 
ROW 50.44 66.90 69.51 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Uganda Revenue Authority’s database 
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2.2.2 Trade policies in the context of COMESA     
Unlike in the EAC market, Uganda’s exports face tariffs of 4–6 percent in COMESA market 
(outside EAC) for most goods. Similar goods from COMESA face same tariffs in Uganda 
(Uganda’s tariff preferences with COMESA countries originally extended to over 700 goods). In 
the model, these tariffs are set to zero and the simulated effects demonstrates the likely impact, 
Uganda’s membership to COMESA free trade area would have on the poor in Uganda.    
Uganda is a founding member of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 
(COMESA), established in November 1993 as a successor to the preferential trade area (PTA) 
for Eastern and Southern Africa. Of the current membership of 19 countries7, 13 are a free trade 
area (FTA)8, while six members, including Uganda are not in the FTA. As a founding member, 
however, Uganda can export to COMESA at tariff rates 60-90 percent below the COMESA 
CET, on a reciprocal basis. In the model, the tariffs on COMESA imports are set to zero to 
explore the alternative option of joining the COMESA FTA.  
Uganda’s major exports to COMESA include manufactured products, coffee, sugar, fish, and 
cereals. Increase in export of these goods is expected to have positive impact on poverty because 
the exported products support rural income. Imports from COMESA, outside of EAC account for 
less than 2 percent of Uganda’s total imports, and are mainly manufactured products. These rates 
(share of exports and imports) are expected to rise with complete phase-out of intra-COMESA 
tariffs and effects on the poor will depend on whether the cost of the consumption bundle falls 
more or less than their wages/income.  
 
2.2.3 Trade policies under the EAC–EPA arrangement    
 
The European Union is the single largest market for Uganda’s goods, accounting for about 30 
percent of Uganda’s total merchandise exports in 2010 against 21 percent of total imports in 
2010. Uganda’s major exports to the EU include, fish (fish products), coffee, tobacco (tobacco 
products) and cotton, and imports from the EU manufactured goods, textiles, wheat, and other 
cereals (Table A2). Being an LDC, Uganda is allowed (under the EU’s Everything But Arms 
                                                 
7 They include Burundi, Comoros, DR Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. 
8 They are Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Kenya, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Sudan, 
Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
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Initiative), duty-free, quota-free access to the EU market, while EU’s exports to Uganda are 
subject to the EAC common external tariffs (CET). The European Commission and the EAC 
partners have sought to establish a free trade area between them. Upon entering an interim 
economic partnership agreement on 27 November 2007, 31 December 2007 was set for a full 
agreement, as WTO waiver on the non-compatibility of the EU preferential trade relations with 
ACP countries would expire by then. By March 2011, the possibility of signing a full agreement 
seemed far from sight as the parties failed to agree on issues of development concerns to EAC 
and on the MFN clause, among other issues.  
The EAC-EU interim partnership agreement requires the EAC partners, including Uganda to 
gradually liberalise 80 percent of their trade for imports from the EU. The liberalisation covering 
mainly capital goods, raw material and intermediate / industrial goods is to progress over a 
period of 15 years (attaining full liberalization over a period of 25 years). Although agricultural 
products, wines and spirits, chemicals, plastics, wood based paper, textiles and clothing, 
footwear, and glassware are excluded from liberalization, eliminating tariffs on EU 
manufactured imports alone will considerably lower tariff revenues. For example, in 2007 
manufactured imports (from the EU) generated Ush 106.361 billion in tariff revenue (Table A3).  
The EU agrees to a complete removal of tariffs on almost all goods imported from the EAC 
countries with transition periods for sugar and rice (http://www.acp-eu-trade.org). 
 
2.3 Multilateralism –Trade policies under the GATT/WTO     
Liberalising Uganda’s trade in the context of GATT/WTO trading arrangement (as considered in 
the model) extends tariffs reduction beyond imports from regional trading partners to include 
imports from rest of the world (ROW). Uganda became a GATT contracting party since 
independence (October 1962) – after acquiring the GATT rights and obligations previously 
accruing to the United Kingdom with respect to its territory under the trade "succession" 
procedures. On 29th September 1994, Uganda ratified the Marrakech Agreement to become a 
founding member of the World Trade Organization (WTO). As a least developed country, 
Uganda is not expected to take on WTO liberalization commitments of cutting down its tariffs, 
and the purpose of reducing tariffs on ROW imports in the model is to demonstrate the potential 
impact of liberalising Uganda’s trade for imports from WTO members.   
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In the model, the rest of the world (ROW) includes the EU and non members of the EAC and 
COMESA. Between 2005 and 2007, Uganda’s total merchandise trade with ROW accounted for 
a share of 75 percent of its overall trade, annually – comprising exports (18 percent) and imports 
(57 percent). Imports have tended to increase faster than exports, and this will deepen the 
balance of trade problem in case of reduction on ROW tariffs, with significant implications for 
poverty in Uganda. Uganda’s major exports to ROW include coffee, fish/fish products, cooking 
oil (fat), oil seeds, tobacco and tobacco products, manufactured products, cotton, and vegetables. 
Its major imports from rest of the world include capital goods (manufactured products), wheat, 
textiles and clothing, cooking oil (fat), oil seeds, sugar, and food items.  In value terms, imports 
from ROW are 5 times Uganda’s exports to ROW.  
Table 4 shows that about 70 percent of total tariffs revenue in 2007 was collected on imports 
from ROW. Most of the revenue losses are expected to be from manufactured imports, which 
generated Ush 532.606 billion in tariff revenue in 2007, textile imports (Ush 47.212 billion), 
sugar (Ush 37.583 billion), and beverages 5.1 billion in 2007. The data in Appendix (Table A1–
A3) provide some numerical insights, which are useful for understanding the results in section 5. 
In the next section, we turn briefly to the CGE micro simulation approaches commonly used in 
analysis of the impact of trade reforms on poverty. 
 
 
3 THE ANALYTICAL MODEL   
3.1  An overview of micro simulation approach 
Computable general equilibrium (CGE) models used in poverty analysis have taken one of the three 
forms:  the representative household approach (the most widely used approach) pioneered by Adelman 
and Robinson (1978), the integrated multi-household approach (IMH) applied by Decaluwé et al (1999), 
or top-down/micro-simulation sequential approach (MSS). For detail review of these three approaches, 
see Savard (2005); Boccanfuso and Savard (2005), Chen and Ravallion (2004), Hertel and Reimer (2004), 
Bourguignon and Spadaro (2005). Decaluwe et al (1999) compare results of poverty and income 
distribution using the three CGE approaches. The results suggest that the IMH approach, that is, the use 
of household data in the CGE model itself is superior to all others in terms of comprehensive analysis of 
poverty. The results are also confirmed by Savard (2005). We applied the IMH approach because it 
accommodates intra-group changes (not fully captured by other approaches) and does not require 
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household grouping or aggregation, thus, avoided the controversy associated with household aggregation. 
Its challenge is handling such a large size of a model (incorporating all households), numerical resolution 
as well as data reconciliation (Boccanfuso and Savard, 2005; Chen and Ravallion, 2004). 
The same approach was used by Cockburn (2001) to analyse the impact of trade liberalisation on 
poverty in Nepal. He endogenises intra group variations by incorporating all the households from a 
nationally representative survey. Cockburn’s findings, as seen by many analysts e.g. Chitiga et al (2005) – 
lend support to the view that micro simulations are very important for poverty analysis. After him, 
Cororaton (2003) used the same approach for the Philippines with 24,797 households, and Chitiga et al 
(2005) in Zimbabwe with 14,006 households. They were able to carry out comprehensive poverty and 
income distribution analysis.  
 
3.2  Structure of the model  
A Computable General Equilibrium model is calibrated to a 2002 social accounting matrix (SAM) for 
Uganda (Alarcon et al, 2006). To keep the model tractable, we modified the SAM to 36 production 
branches/commodity sectors from 74 in the original SAM, and 3 factors of production (land, labour and 
capital) from 18. The rest of the world (ROW) account was decomposed into the EAC, COMESA and the 
ROW markets. The 9,711 households from the 2002/03 national household survey were incorporated into 
the SAM by entering data related to the final consumption of individual households (in terms of 
commodities), income by economic activity, etc from the survey, into the SAM (and balancing sum of 
consumption, income, etc over all households with the row/column totals for households in the SAM).  
Government expenditures in the model are funded from tariff revenues and revenues from indirect 
taxes (modelled as a value added tax, ‘VAT’ and income tax, ‘Ytax’). Tariffs and taxes on commodities, 
labour, capital, household income, and corporate income are given as fixed ad valorem rates. Tax 
revenues and income transfers received by government from the ROW, including international aid are 
used to meet government demand for commodities, to pay wages and capital and to deliver public goods, 
including transfers (pension) to households and other institutions. The government’s budget balance 
(public savings) is endogenously determined. With expectation that tariff revenues will decline ceteris 
paribus, the model allows an increase in VAT and Ytax to ensure revenue neutrality. Each of the 36 
production sectors of the domestic economy utilises a nested production technology. Commodities are 
produced using skilled and unskilled labour, intermediate inputs, capital and land. The value added is 
equal to the remunerations of the factors of production: capital, labour and land. 
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Labour is assumed to be mobile across sectors. However, unskilled agricultural workers can be 
employed only in the agricultural sector, while skilled workers are mobile between agricultural and non-
agricultural sectors. The combination of labour in production is modelled according to constant elasticity 
of substitution (CES) function. In equilibrium, wages serve to equate demand and supply of labour. 
Capital is considered to be sector-specific, and primary factor supplies are exogenous to the model. The 
demand for intermediate inputs and value added are modelled as fixed proportions of total output. The 
components of value added are aggregated using a CES function. The transformation of domestic 
production into exports is modelled according to the CET function.   Exports are shared between the 
EAC, COMESA, and the ROW markets. This relationship is characterised by three different CES 
functions.  
Export supply, 
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where cQD is quantity sold domestically of domestic output c; cPE  is export price for commodity c (in 
domestic currency); cPD is domestic price of domestic commodity c; 
q
c  is Armington function share 
parameter; and 
q
c is Armington function exponent.  In each of the three foreign markets, export supply is 
determined by demand, and the price received by producers is given in domestic currency. Similarly, 
importers have the options to import commodities either from the EAC, COMESA, or the ROW 
according to CES function. Imported and domestic goods are assumed to be imperfect substitutes 
(Armington, 1969). Domestically produced and imported goods combine to form a CES aggregate:   
   qcqcqc cqccqcqcc QDQMaQQ  
1
1.
     (4.2) 
   
where, cQQ  is quantity of goods in domestic market; 
q
ca  is Armington function shift parameter for 
commodity c; and cQM is quantity of import:  
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The domestic import price is the world price adjusted by the exchange rate and import taxes. 
Therefore, changes in tariffs cause changes in the composite prices of the traded goods. The model allows 
tariff rates to differ depending on whether the imports are from the EAC, COMESA or the ROW. 
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Importers/consumers are expected to allocate their expenditure on EAC, COMESA and ROW imports, 
and each allocation decision is modelled as a CES function.  
Output cQX  is distributed between the domestic market and export markets (EAC, COMESA and 
the ROW). In the domestic market, the goods are sold to households, government, or used as intermediate 
inputs or investment goods. Indirect taxes are added to the local (producer) price to form domestic prices, 
which, together with the import price, form the composite price of domestically consumed goods via a 
CES function (equation 4.4).     tctctc ctcctccc QDQEQX  
1
1.
     (4.4) 
 
where cQX is aggregate domestic output of commodity c; c  is CET scale parameter; 
t
c  is CET 
elasticity of transformation; cQE is quantity of exports, and 
t
c  is constant elasticity of transformation 
(CET) parameter. Export price is affected by output price, which in turn is affected by input prices. 
Export prices may vary across the three markets: EAC, COMESA and ROW. As referred to earlier, 
household income comprises wages, profits from rent of capital, and transfers from government, firms, 
other households and the rest of the world (remittances). Besides savings, households use part of their 
income to pay taxes, pay other households or institutions (transfers), and to pay for goods and services.  
Final demand by each household arises from nested constant elasticity of substitution (CES) utility 
function subjected to the budget constraint, determined via a linear expenditure system (LES), which 
allows different marginal budget shares for different households to be included.9  
That is, 
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  (4.5) 
where  chC  is demand for commodity c by household h; cp : price of commodity c; cb : quantity of 
commodity c in household basic needs basket;  ch  is share of commodity c in the consumption of 
household h; hC is total household consumption; jp are unit prices of different commodities in the 
household basic needs basket; jb : quantities of commodities in basic needs basket (these quantities are 
fixed, apply to all household groups and remain invariant from one simulation to another)10; and ip : 
prices of composite commodities.    
                                                 
9 The LES utility function restricts households to consuming a basket of subsistence goods. The minimum consumption of a good 
by one household is derived using the Frisch parameter and the income elasticity. For a detailed presentation, see Dervis et al 
(1982). 
10 This approach is consistent with Ravallion’s (1994) approach to estimating absolute poverty, the “cost-of-basic needs” method. 
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

J
j
jjbp
1
= the monetary value of the minimum consumption (monetary poverty line), determined 
endogenously within the CGE model. Each household is assumed to behave in such a way that it first 
satisfies its minimum consumption of the respective commodities. Changes in the composite prices 
induced by changes in tariff rates will affect the cost of the basic needs basket and therefore, the rate of 
poverty. A number of general equilibrium responses triggered by these price changes such as changes in 
wages, composition of output, exports and imports; and pattern of employment are captured in the model. 
The population below the poverty line remains at base level before a policy shock. However, if composite 
commodity prices ( ip ) rise following an external shock, the cost of the basic needs basket, hence the 
poverty line will increase and the population below the poverty line will rise ceteris paribus. A Foster-
Greer-Thorbecke (F-G-T) poverty measure due to Foster et al (1984) P is used to compare poverty (pre- 
and post-simulation experiment).11.   
 Finally, demand for each composite good is assumed to equal supply of such good. Demand for 
exports equals supply of exports; and total investment equals savings. The world prices of imports and 
exports, the current account balance and nominal exchange rate are exogenous to the model. Flexible 
prices serve to clear the markets for all commodities and factors. The macro closures apply to the 
government, the savings-investment balance, and external markets (EAC, COMESA, and ROW).  
 
3.3  Model Closure 
Nominal government expenditure is equal to fixed quantities of consumption goods multiplied by their 
endogenous prices. Fixing real government expenditure insulates the poverty-related variable from the 
influence of government spending. Government income is held at base level, so that any reduction in 
government income from tariff cuts is compensated endogenously by additional revenue from value-
added tax (VAT) and income tax (Ytax). 
                                                 
11 That is, 
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where iy  is adult equivalent consumption expenditures for those individuals below the poverty line, and 
zero for those above, z is the endogenous poverty line, 
*n the total population, and q the number of poor 
people. The parameter   takes the value of zero for the headcount index ( 0P ), 1 for the poverty gap ( 1P ) 
and 2 for the squared poverty gap ( 2P ).   
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 The basic needs basket of commodities for the poor in Uganda consists mainly of unprocessed 
foodstuffs. Introducing replacement taxes may not increase the cost of the unprocessed food component 
of the basic needs basket as this component does not attract taxes (i.e.  are exempted from value-added 
tax). Total nominal investment is equal to fixed quantities of investment goods multiplied by their 
endogenous prices. The propensities to save by individual households adjust proportionately to 
accommodate the fixed total real investment formulation. This is achieved through a factor in the 
household saving function, which adjusts endogenously. 
The current account balance is exogenous (foreign savings is equal to foreign account deficit) and 
the nominal exchange rate is the model’s numéraire. Flexible foreign savings serve to clear the current 
account balance. As long as the nominal foreign exchange rate is fixed, the presence of foreign 
savings/exchange rate does not influence the savings-investment closure of the model, according to which 
the savings value determines the investment value. Real exchange rate is equal to nominal exchange rate 
multiplied by the world export prices, divided by domestic price index. Changes in real exchange rate 
(due to variations in export prices) effectively clear the foreign trade sector. 
In the factor markets, wages clear the labour market, and a fixed capital use for each activity is 
assumed. We assume some unemployment with fixed, activity-specific real wages for labour. Besides 
capital, land is fixed in the short run, and technical change and other shift variables are assumed to remain 
constant. Walras law is satisfied since private consumption equals the income from primary factors plus 
net transfers to households (consumers) by government from domestic and international trade taxes.  
  
3.4  Data Limitations 
The household survey exhibited some gaps in data on wage rates and income by economic activity, net 
savings of the households, and inter-household transfers within the domestic household sector. These 
were estimated basing on other related survey information. Some of the commodities in SAM (e.g. trade 
services, railway transport, road transport and other transport services) and factor income transfers from 
the ROW to the domestic household sector were not accounted for in the household survey. Expenditures 
on these commodities have been allocated to each household according to some expenditure share 
criteria. Second, reconciling data was very challenging as a result of incorporating a large number of 
households into the SAM. This led to adjusting some figures (especially inter-household transfers, 
consumption expenditures, income, etc.) in view of considerations to balance the SAM. However, the 
order of magnitude of missing/unreliable data and related adjustments made are within reasonable limits, 
and as such, we do not expect it to affect the model/results significantly. 
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4 EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS   
4.1 Policy Simulations 
Three types of policy simulations are performed in line with the model closure described above. First, the 
weighted average of EAC tariffs is set at zero i.e. imports from EAC enter Uganda free of duty - 
including category B goods exports from Kenya. The reason for including category B goods is to avoid 
the modelling difficulties associated with isolating these goods in the model. Since the 10% tariff on 
category B goods was a temporary measure, applying uniform condition to EAC imports is appropriate. 
In the second simulation, the average weight of non-EAC COMESA tariffs is set at zero (i.e. imports 
from COMESA countries enter Uganda free of tariffs) to demonstrate the likely impact that Uganda’s 
membership to COMESA free trade area would have on the poor in Uganda. In the third simulation, 
tariffs are set at zero across the board (i.e. EAC, COMESA and ROW imports, including sensitive 
products). Although this simulation is not identical to what happens in the real world, the purpose is to 
demonstrate the potential effect of complete tariff reduction. 
 In what follows, we first present the sectoral and macro results arising from these simulations such as 
the reaction of imports, domestic prices, output and wages in the economy as they are key variables that 
affect poverty, and then results related to poverty.  
4.2 Reduction in EAC Tariffs by 100% 
A 100% tariffs reduction on EAC imports results into a rise in EAC imports across all sectors ( Table 1) 
(see Table A1 for full sector coverage). The highest increase in imports occurs in the highly protected 
sectors: dairy, beverages and textile sectors. This implies that, with complete phase-out of intra-EAC 
tariffs, sectors that were highly protected are likely to contract due to rise of imports. Food imports from 
the COMESA are predicted to decline, while imports of beverages, sugar and manufactured products 
from COMESA and ROW are likely to rise, at least in the short run. Cereals imports from the EAC are 
predicted to increase by 1.1%, and imports of other food commodities (e.g. vegetables, legumes, sesame), 
by 2.6%.   
The 1% rise in cereal imports from the EAC is more than compensated by a 3% fall in imports of 
cereals from COMESA. The fall in COMESA imports suggests that the complete phase-out of intra-EAC 
tariffs is likely to suppress imports of cereals and agricultural food from countries outside EAC that are 
members of COMESA (non-EAC COMESA countries). Imports of cereals from the rest of the world are 
predicted to rise by 1.8%. 
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Manufactured imports from the EAC are predicted to grow by over 4.3% (Table 1) as the 
manufacturing sector is relatively protected. As such, the adverse effects on the manufacturing sector in 
Uganda arising from EAC tariff reforms will be minimal. 
 
Table 5. Changes in imports by region sector after policy simulation 
 
 Base level EAC 
imports 
Per cent change in EAC 
imports relative to the 
base 
Variation in imports from other 
region (%) 
Sector  COMESA ROW 
Livestock, livestock products 1.32 9.1 6.9 -2.1 
Milk, dairy 0.40 13.3 4.3 -1.0 
Fish, fish products 0.06 7.6 0.1 -7.8 
Cereals 12.72 1.1 -3.1 1.8 
Other food commodities 1/ 17.84 2.6 -0.5 -0.1 
Sugar 9.82 6.5 5.9 18.4 
Agricultural, cash-based commodities /2 13.37 12.7 -0.3 6.1 
Beverages 5.34 21.3 3.7 12.9 
Textiles 11.3 38.4 -7.8 7.3 
Manufactures  48.0 4.3 2.5 11.4 
 
Note:  1/ sesame, vegetables, fruits, spices, groundnut, and other foodstuff    2/ coffee, tea, tobacco, cotton/textile 
 
 
  The effect of the complete phase-out of intra-EAC tariffs also remains positive for domestic 
production and domestic prices in most sectors (Table 2). Overall, two sectors face a fall in production, 
partly due to rising level of imports: beverages (-17.1%) and fish sectors (-2.4%).  Incidentally, the 
beverages sector happens to be among the sectors that were highly protected and relatively subsidised. 
Besides beverages, prices fall for traditional cash crops: coffee, tea, tobacco and cotton, but remain nearly 
unchanged for dairy. The quantities of dairy imports as share of composite supply in the domestic market 
(production) are not significant enough to induce change on domestic production and prices in the dairy 
sector.  
Similarly, cereals/food imports account for less than 3% of total composite supply of cereals/food in 
the domestic market and have had little influence on the domestic prices and production after this 
simulation. The neutrality (or near neutrality) of Uganda’s food sector to EAC tariff reforms is helped by 
the fact that Uganda is a net food exporter in the EAC. The rise in domestic prices of fish is attributed to a 
fall in fish production.  
The fall in fish production could have been triggered by changes in relative prices but not necessarily 
the rise in fish imports (7.6% reported in Table 1). The increase in domestic price of sugar despite the rise 
in domestic production and imports is due to increase in export demand helped by depreciation of the 
Uganda shilling against most of the EAC and major currencies (Table A2 reports a 45.2% rise in sugar 
exports to EAC market). 
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Table 6. Effect of tariff change on domestic prices (composite) and production by sector 
 
 
Index of composite 
prices base 
(average) 
Production level of 
domestic firm, base 
(average) 
Variation in domestic prices and 
production (%) 
Sector  Prices    Production  
Livestock, livestock products 1.02 118.2 0.9 1.9 
Milk, dairy 1.07 83.0 0.01 0.0 
Fish, fish products 1.00 67.2 16.1 -2.4 
Cereals 1.02 59.1 6.3 2.7 
Other food commodities 1/ 1.03 70.0 7.9 0.9 
Sugar 1.00 88.3 15.0 3.5 
Agricultural, cash-based commodities /2 0.95 161.8 -1.3 5.0 
Beverages 1.03 48.0 -10.1 -17.1 
Manufactures  1.01 84.0 8.5 0.4 
Note 1/ and /2 as in Table 1 
 
 
Following a complete phase-out of the EAC tariffs, demand for unskilled labour increases in all 
sectors, except in fish and beverages sectors where demand for unskilled labour falls by 2.5% and 2.1%, 
respectively. Unskilled sector wage drops in the beverages sector, livestock, and traditional agricultural 
cash crops sector. Demand for skilled labour also drops in primary sectors (livestock, cereals, and other 
food production sectors) that are intensive in unskilled labour. 
Where the relative price of unskilled labour intensive goods have increased, the wages of unskilled 
workers are likely to go up, as it is the case of an increase in sector wages for unskilled workers in the 
food crop sector (cereals, sesame, vegetables, fruits, spices, groundnuts, soy beans, etc). The highest cut 
in sector wages (5% skilled wages and 9% unskilled) occurs in the beverages sector. The reform of EAC 
tariffs has relatively marginal effect on skilled sector wages, which remained within an average range of -
2.4 to 5% change (except for beverages). Exports to the EAC markets rose in 27 out of the 36 sectors 
reported in Table A1. The top five export growth sectors are:  sugar (with 45% rise in exports), wheat 
(39%), cooking oil/oil seed (38.5%), manufactures (38%), and rice (35.4%). 
Uganda’s top exports growth sector in the COMESA market as predicted by the model is sugar. In the 
ROW market, coffee tops growth in Uganda’s export sector at 38.7%, followed by tobacco (30.5%), and 
cooking oil (21.9%). The rise in exports is likely to spur domestic production in the medium term to long 
term, which will benefit unskilled wage employment especially in rural areas. The general rise in level of 
production across sectors is largely export-driven. 
A complete phase-out of intra-EAC tariffs could offer new avenues for poverty reduction through its 
potential to stimulate exports, increase unskilled sector wages and lower prices of other importable goods 
consumed by the poor.   
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Table 7. Simulated effect of tariff change on labour demand by sector 
 
 Variation in labour demand (%) 
 
Variation in wages (%) 
Sector  unskilled  skilled unskilled   skilled   
Livestock, livestock products 0.89 -6.04  -0.05 1.93 
Fish, fish products -2.54 0.02  0.05 -2.40 
Cereals 1.00 -2.01  9.03 0.00 
Other food commodities 1/ 1.05 -0.01  2.40 0.90 
Sugar 6.02 0.30  7.08 0.50 
Agricultural, cash-based commodities /2 0.03 -0.01  -2.23 4.91 
Beverages -2.15 -0.57  -5.01 -9.06 
Manufactures  0.79 0.32  0.10 0.17 
 
Note: 1/ and 2/ as in Table 1 
  
4.3 Reduction in COMESA Tariffs by 100% 
On simulating a 100% reduction in COMESA tariffs, Uganda’s imports from COMESA increased, but 
the increases are modest in scope for a number of sectors (Tables 4 and A1). Imports of tobacco from 
COMESA grew by 19.8% after the shock, manufactures by 16.5%, sugar 15.9%, poultry and poultry 
products 15.3%, and bottled water 13%. Most imports from COMESA are growing from small bases. 
Any small change tends to be magnified. While reducing tariffs on COMESA imports will invite more 
imports from the COMESA region, these imports are likely to be concentrated in few sectors, outside the 
sensitive tariff lines (Table A1). 
 
Table 8. Import reaction to reduction in COMESA tariffs 
 
 
Base level 
COMESA 
imports 
Index of 
composite/domestic 
prices (Base level)  
Variation in imports and domestic 
prices (%) 
Sector  
 imports from 
COMESA Domestic prices 
Livestock, livestock products 1.32 1.02 5.67 0.00 
Poultry, poultry products 0.38 1.00 15.3 -0.01 
Fish, fish products 0.01 1.02 0.10 0.00 
Cereals 0.91 1.03 -5.25 0.00 
Other food commodities  1/ 0.98 1.00 2.94 0.00 
Sugar 47.84 0.95 15.09 0.00 
Agricultural, cash-based commodities /2 1.37 1.03 0.23 0.02 
Tobacco 29.57 1.01 19.81 -0.01 
Beverages 0.32 1.02 7.70 0.00 
Textiles 1.30 1.00 9.23 0.00 
Manufactures  33.56 1.02 16.50 0.00 
 
Note:  1/ sesame, vegetables, fruits, spices, groundnut, and other foodstuff    2/ coffee, tea, tobacco, cotton/textile 
  
The rise in imports from COMESA due to tariff changes does not impact the level of domestic 
production/supply significantly so to exert pressure on domestic prices (Table 4). It follows therefore, that 
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the gain that the poor derive from changes in COMESA tariffs  in terms of reduced prices is relatively 
small compared with price reduction arising from removal of intra-EAC tariffs. The gain to the economy 
comes from the rise in exports (Table A2) of rice (35%), cooking oil (40%), sugar (46%) and wheat 
(39%). The poor employed in this sector are likely to benefit from a rise in their incomes.  
3.4 Reduction Across the Board of Import Tariffs by 100% 
First, we set tariffs at zero on all imports from EAC, COMESA and ROW, including sensitive 
products.12 Imports increase for most sectors after setting overall tariffs at zero (Table 5). The rest of the 
world imports grew faster than EAC or COMESA imports. For example, sugar imports from the ROW 
rose by 26.5% after simulation, compared with a 5.9% and 18.4% rise in sugar imports from the EAC and 
the COMESA, respectively. Again, higher increases in imports are associated with sectors that were 
highly protected (sensitive products) such as sugar, rice, wheat, textile, and manufactures (Table 5).  
Next, we set tariffs at zero on all imports, except sensitive products. The increase in imports especially 
of sensitive products was about 50% lower than the case of a complete removal of tariffs on sensitive 
products. For example, 19% increase in sugar imports resulted from zero tariffs on sugar imports, against 
9.2% increase in sugar imports when the duty on sugar stayed at the original rate of 100% (Table 5). 
Sector that is resilient to tariffs is textiles. Textile imports are estimated to increase by 35.1% with zero 
tariffs on textile imports and by 32.4% with 35% (average) duty on textiles. Increase in imports 
particularly of manufactured products, textile, and beverages push the prices of domestically produced 
import-competitive products down (Table 5). 
 
Table 9. Changes in imports across sectors, after tariffs reduction  
 
 Overall % change in imports 
with 100% tariff reduction  
% change in ROW imports with 
100% tariff reduction (with/without 
protection to special product 
% change in EAC and 
COMESA imports with 
100% tariff reduction  
Sector  
including 
tariffs on SP  
Excl. tariffs 
on SP SP protected  SP not protected EAC COMESA* 
Livestock, livestock products 11.0 n/a 0.0 0.0 9.0 7.1 
Fish 7.7 n/a n/a -2.9 7.6 -0.1 
Cereals 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.8 -3.1 1.8 
Wheat  4.5 3.8 4.0 7.7 -5.6 -6.8 
Rice  12.5 11.9 0.6 2.6 10.5 -3.0 
Other food commodities 1.0 n/a n/a 1.6 -0.1 -0.1 
Sugar 19.0 9.2 18.3 26.5 5.9 18.4 
Agricultural, cash-based 
commodities  /2 1.3 n/a n/a 2.7 -0.3 6.1 
Beverages 21.0 n/a n/a 15.3 20.9 2.7 
Textile 35.1 32.4 7.1 15.2 29.4 0.6 
Manufactures  21.6 n/a n/a 23.3 2.3 1.3 
 
Notes:  SP: sensitive products.  * Tariffs on sensitive products maintained on imports from COMESA   
1/ sesame, vegetables, fruits, spices, groundnut, and other foodstuff    2/ coffee, tea, tobacco, cotton  
                                                 
12 Uganda, being an LDC is not expected to take on WTO liberalisation commitments of cutting down its tariffs. The 
purpose of these simulations is to demonstrate the potential impact of fully liberalising Uganda’s imports. 
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The 5.5% fall in production in manufacturing sector (Table 6), 5% fall in textile production and 
18.7% fall in beverages production predicted by the model suggests an increased competition from 
cheaper imports.   
 
Table 10. Effect on domestic prices and output  
 
 
Index of 
composite prices 
base (average) 
Domestic output of 
firm, base (average) 
Percentage change in  
Sector  Domestic prices   production  
Livestock, livestock products 1.02 118.2 0.9 1.9 
Fish, fish products 1.00 67.2 16.1 -2.4 
Cereals 1.02 59.1 6.3 5.3 
Other food commodities 1/ 1.03 70.0 7.0 1.6 
Sugar 1.00 88.3 0.9 0.8 
Agricultural, cash-based commodities /2 0.95 161.8 -1.3 5.0 
Beverages 1.03 48.0 -17.0 -29.0 
Textile  1.00 98.2 -11.0 -5.0 
Manufactures  1.01 84.0 -1.9 -5..5 
Note: /1 and 2 as in Table 1 
 The results presented in this table are derived from simulating a 100% reduction in import tariffs (except for tariffs on sensitive 
products). Original tariffs on sensitive sectors are maintained since we expect these sectors to be excluded from future 
liberalisation commitments, including that under EPA arrangement. 
 
Some poor households may gain from the price fall especially if the share of these imports in the 
consumption basket of the poor is large enough. However, there is a decline in the wages of the poor 
employed in the manufacturing, textile, and beverages sectors as we shall see later in Table 7. They may 
become worse off as a result unless the cost of the consumption bundle falls more than their wages. 
Domestic prices of sugar, livestock/livestock products, fish, cereals, and other food commodities went up 
due to increase in their exports and domestic demand. For all these products, except fish, domestic 
production also increased. Domestic price of sugar increases by 1% (Table 6), in contrast with 15% price 
increase in the previous simulation (Table 2). Sugar production increases by 0.8% under the 100% tariff 
reduction scenario on all imports (Table 6), compared with a 3.5% increase under the EAC tariff 
reduction (Table 2). The poor rely very much on their labour, and thus defines their condition after a 
shock. Table 7 shows increase in demand for unskilled labour and fall in demand for skilled labour in 
primary agricultural sectors (cereals, other food production sector, and livestock). 
As expected, wages for unskilled labour employed in the livestock sector, cereals, sugar and other 
food sectors improve. These sectors use more unskilled labour than the manufacturing, and beverages 
sectors which have seen their production contract after the shock. As expected, manufacturing wages drop 
and skilled labour wages fall in primary sectors. The rise in unskilled labour wages and a fall in skilled 
labour wages suggest a narrowing of the wage gap between skilled and unskilled labour. 
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Table 11. Effects of tariff reduction on labour demand and sector wages 
 
 Changes in labour demand (%) 
 
Changes in wages (%) 
 unskilled labour skilled labour unskilled labour skilled labour 
Sector  rural  urban rural  urban rural urban rural urban 
Livestock 3.10 0.89 0.05 -0.04  9.06 0.55 1.88 -0.03 
Fish -0.10 0.54 -0.49 0.20  -10.5 1.15 0.00 1.22 
Cereals 12.10 3.50 -0.01 -2.01  5.70 6.03 0.00 -0.01 
Other food com sector 2.40 1.05 -0.90 -0.01  2.98 2.40 -0.05 -0.03 
Sugar 4.50 6.02 0.10 1.30  5.10 7.08 0.09 3.65 
Agricultural, cash-based 
commodities /1 -0.01 0.03 0.00 -0.01  -2.03 1.01 0.00 -5.91 
Beverages -15.07 -2.15 -1.07 -0.17  -0.02 -19.02 0.01 -18.50 
Manufactures  -10.32 0.79 -1.10 -0.56  -0.01 -19.17 0.00 -11.11 
Note: /1 as in Table 1 
  
It can be expected that the poor in rural areas benefit from 100% reduction in tariffs because demand for 
their labour rises hence increasing their wages. At the same time the prices of the goods they produce 
increase. The poor who are employed primarily in the export sector and consume importable goods gain 
more than those who are primarily employed in the import-competing sector and consume primarily 
exportable goods. In the long run, as labour and capital become mobile across sectors, labour should pay 
across sectors. Import sector is expected to contract in relative terms while the export sector expands and 
domestic industries are able to adjust. 
   
4.5 Analysing Revenue Impact of Tariff Reductions  
As discussed before, our model ensures revenue neutrality; any reduction in government revenue from 
tariff cuts is compensated endogenously by additional VAT and income tax. However, we are also 
interested in the revenue impact of tariff reduction. We relaxed the neutrality assumption, changed some 
closure rules and re-ran the simulations (that is, a 100% tariffs reduction on EAC imports, a 100% 
reduction on COMESA tariffs, and a 100% reduction of tariffs on all imports). The results show an 
overall loss in government revenue, but more so under full liberalisation as reported in Table 8. Revenue 
falls by 13.2% on removing EAC tariffs (simulation 1), by 8% on removing COMESA tariffs (simulation 
2) and by 19.6% on removing all tariffs (simulation 3). Across sectors, tax revenue declines in all sectors. 
Most of the revenue losses are from manufactured imports. EAC tariffs reform accounts for about 16% of 
revenue lost from manufactured imports, COMESA tariff reduction for 11% and complete tariff removal 
for 43% revenue loss.  
This means that without wide bases for consumption and income taxes to compensate for the decline 
in tariffs revenues, full liberalisation has the potential to stifle government expenditure: government 
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demand for commodities, payment of wages and capital and delivery of public goods, including 
expenditure on poverty reduction programmes and transfers (pension).  
   
Table 12. Impact on government revenue (by sector) due to tariffs reduction 
Sector  Base 
Simulation 1:  
100% reduction in 
EAC weighted average 
tariffs  
Simulation 2:  
100% reduction in 
COMESA weighted average 
tariffs  
Simulation 3:  
100% reduction in 
tariffs  
  Change in sector revenue collection (%) 
Livestock, livestock products 628.2 -4.65 -6.13 -14.42 
Fish, fish products 16.9 -17.00 -0.90 -35.20 
Food, agric primary com 1,289.4 -9.43 -8.03 -48.65 
Agricultural cash commodities  /3 757.7 -4.48 -0.22 -11.13 
Manufacturers, and others 2,276.2 -15.87 -11.44 -43.10 
Effect on revenue (%)  -13.24 -7.91 -19.6 
 
Note: 3/ coffee, tea, tobacco, cotton/textile, vanilla, cocoa, flowers  
 
4.6 Poverty Impact of the Tariff Reductions  
Following a tariff reduction (Simulations 1–3), the monetary poverty line decreases in all cases as 
reported in Table 9, but it falls more in the case of a complete removal of tariffs (by 2.94%), than in the 
case of removal of EAC tariffs (2.76%, or removal of non-EAC COMESA tariffs (1.08%). 
  
 Table 13. Monetary poverty line 
  
Simulation 1  
100% reduction in EAC 
weighted average tariffs  
Simulation 2  
100% reduction in 
COMESA weighted 
average tariffs  
Simulation 3  
100% reduction in 
tariffs  
 Base 
New poverty line after 
simulation 
New poverty line after 
simulation 
New poverty line 
after simulation 
Poverty line  / 1 NHS 137,568.0    
Poverty line (model)   /2 137, 694.84 133,894.46 136,207.73 129,957.96 
Poverty line  /3 137, 694.84 133,894.06   
Change in monetary poverty 
line (%) 
 -2.76 -1.08 -2.94 
  
Note:  *  
/1 NHS: monetary poverty line published in the Uganda National Household Survey 2002/2003;   
/2 monetary poverty line (Base) generated by the model is much the same with food poverty line in 1/;   
Household Survey (the poverty line allows for some limited expenditure on non-food items that constitute the basic needs.   
3/ poverty line generated by the model within 10-15% change in elasticity parameters.   
 
The fall in the poverty line in each of these cases is induced by a combination of factors, including a fall 
in composite prices of commodities comprising the basic needs basket of the poor. The decrease in 
composite prices is attributed to a fall in relative prices of imports (in domestic currency) following a 
removal of tariffs. The results suggest that all the three liberalisation strategies (removing EAC tariffs, 
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non-EAC COMESA tariffs, and all tariffs) are likely to facilitate poverty reduction in Uganda. However, 
greater poverty reduction is likely to be achieved with a complete removal of tariffs on all imports: from 
EAC, COMESA and ROW. 
We explore this further by applying the Foster, Greer and Thorbecke (1984) (FGTα) decomposable 
indices (P0 and P1) focussing on changes in P indices after the shocks. Table 10 shows the changes in 
poverty headcount index 0(P ) – the proportion of people living below the poverty line, and the poverty 
gap index ( )1P – the depth of poverty, the minimum cost of eliminating poverty through perfectly targeted 
transfers. National poverty headcount (including poverty in rural and urban areas) falls in all cases 
(removal of EAC tariffs, removal of non-EAC COMESA tariffs, and removal of all tariffs), but it falls 
more in the case of a complete removal of tariffs by 3.2%, and least in the case of removal of non-EAC 
COMESA tariffs (1.3 percent). These results reinforce the findings in Table 9, which shows the potential 
poverty (reduction) impact of fully liberalising trade as opposed to regional trading arrangement. 
 
Table 14. FGT Poverty indices 0(P , 1P and )2P  
 Base Sim1 
Variation 
(%) Sim2 
Variation 
(%) Sim3 
Variation 
(%) 
 Poverty head count, 0     
All (National) 38.800 37.837 -2.482 38.283 -1.333 37.546 -3.232 
Rural 42.700 41.901 -1.871 42.392 -0.721 41.842 -2.010 
Urban 14.400 13.978 -2.933 14.130 -1.874 13.903 -3.450 
 Poverty gap index, 1     
All (National) 11.900 11.626 -2.301 11.729 -1.433 11.530 -3.111 
Rural 13.100 12.913 -1.425 12.981 -0.912 12.842 -1.970 
Urban 3.900 3.827 -1.861 3.837 -1.610 3.761 -3.554 
 Severity of poverty, 2     
All (National) 4.84 4.643 -4.070 4.738 -2.103 4.556 -5.870 
Rural 5.027 4.9218 -2.093 4.972 -1.091 4.917 -2.198 
Urban 2.659 2.569 -3.371 2.583 -2.867 2.498 -6.043 
  
Table 10 further indicates that poverty headcount index falls more in urban areas than in rural areas, in all 
the cases. For example, poverty headcount falls by 3.4% in urban areas after removal of all tariffs 
(simulation 3) against a 2% fall in rural areas. 
The depth of poverty (as measured by poverty gap index, )1P  has gone down in all the cases and in 
both urban and rural areas. Like the case of headcount index, poverty gap index shows more improvement 
in the case of removal of all tariffs (where it declined by 3.1%) than the case of removal of EAC or non-
EAC COMESA tariffs (simulations 1 and 2, respectively). 1P  falls more in urban areas than in rural 
areas, for example, a 3.5% fall in urban poverty gap compared with a 1.9% fall in rural poverty gap after a 
removal of all tariffs (simulation 3, Table 10). The results suggest that the cost of lifting the poor (all 
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households below the poverty line) out of poverty through transfers will be lower under multilateral trade 
liberalisation than under regional integration (removal of tariffs on EAC or non-EAC COMESA tariffs). 
The severity of poverty, measured by P2, falls in all cases; by 4% with removal of EAC tariffs, 2 percent 
with removal of non-COMESA EAC tariffs and by 6% with removal of all tariffs. Severity of poverty 
falls more in urban areas than in rural areas. 
4.7 Sensitivity Analysis  
The simulation results are influenced by the choice of parameters in the model. This section highlights the 
impact (on the results) of varying the values of some of the key parameters. There are three parameters 
that have had a strong impact on the results: the elasticities of substitution between imports of different 
origin; elasticities of substitution between domestic and imported goods; and elasticities of transformation 
(in CET function). All parameters retained their standard (original) values, except the parameter in 
question. Variables associated with welfare improvements, for example, domestic output, and wages 
reacted positively to an increase in substitution elasticities. This is not surprising, since higher elasticities 
imply that agents are able to shift to sectors, products and sources that are cheaper and economically more 
rewarding. 
 By varying the elasticity estimates (from about 10 to 50 percentage point below and above the 
standards GTAP elasticity indexes), the poverty line index varied between -0.01 to about -1.2 percentage 
points in the three simulations. And, the effects were much stronger for the third policy scenario (100% 
reduction in tariffs) than any of the two simulations performed separately.   
 
5 CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
In this paper, we outlined the developments in trade policies in Uganda since the 1980s and provided 
empirical evidence on how tariff reduction can impact on poverty. Evidence from a CGE evaluation of 
trade policies at regional level (EAC and COMESA) reveals differences in impact of these policies on key 
macro variables and poverty level. However, it shows that both of them will reduce poverty. A complete 
phase-out of tariffs on EAC imports is likely to reduce poverty as shown in the decrease in poverty 
threshold (-2.76%) and poverty headcount index. Tariff reduction on COMESA imports is also likely to 
facilitate poverty reduction (as poverty line decreased by 1.08% on implementing a tariff reduction on 
COMESA imports, poverty headcount decreased in rural and urban areas). Still, it can be concluded that 
greater poverty reduction is likely to be achieved with liberalisation that is wider in scope than regional 
arrangements under EAC and COMESA alone (as evidenced by 2.94% fall in poverty threshold with 
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wider tariff reduction). However, noting the reaction to tariff reduction of the sectors that are currently 
classified as ‘sensitive’ in Uganda, care is needed when opening up these sectors to free trade due to 
vulnerability from increased imports. One of the most influential channels of trade policy in Uganda is the 
first order effect transmitted through the price of imports. This implies that to reduce poverty, policies 
need to pay more attention to enhancing output in import-competing sectors, and stimulating production 
and exports in the agricultural sector. This will minimise the long run price effects of rising imports when 
these sectors are fully open to competition.   
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Table A1. Simulation results: Effects of tariff reductions on imports 
  
 Simulation 1: 100% reduction in tariffs on imports from EAC 
Simulation 2: 100% reduction in 
COMESA tariffs 
Simulation 3: 100% 
reduction in tariffs 
Sector EAC imports % change in imports from Imports from COMESA Imports from ROW 
 Base EAC  COMESA ROW Base Change, %   Base  Change, % 
sec1 0.07 -8.7 7.8 -19.0 0.02 1.9 0.10 11.0 
sec2 0.75 12.4 1.2 9.8 0.10 2.2 0.04 10.1 
sec3 0.10 -30.8 4.3 10.8 0.38 15.3 0.01 12.3 
sec4 0.40 13.3 4.3 -1.0 0.07 3.3 0.82 -9.9 
sec5 0.06 7.6 0.1 -7.8 0.01 0.1 0.40 7.7 
sec6 0.01 6.4 0.0 -8.9 0.01 0.0 0.01 0.0 
sec7 0.91 19.1 -0.5 0.5 0.01 -1.5 16.00 11.9 
sec8 0.90 -9.2 -2.3 -9.8 0.01 2.3 3.12 -7.9 
sec9 0.40 16.1 -0.5 1.1 0.01 0.1 0.76 1.0 
sec10 5.90 1.8 -0.9 10.1 0.01 -2.5 52.75 1.8 
sec11 0.70 5.0 5.3 1.8 0.47 7.3 1.32 9.0 
sec12 0.03 2.3 -2.0 -5.7 0.01 -5.0 0.01 0.0 
sec13 0.01 0.0 0.0 -8.4 0.01 0.0 0.22 0.0 
sec14 0.01 0.0 -10.0 -10.0 0.43 10.0 0.15 4.0 
sec15 9.82 6.5 5.9 18.4 47.84 15.9 12.55 9.2 
sec16 6.20 -4.5 -6.9 4.1 0.00 4.9 72.61 3.8 
sec17 0.40 0.0 0.0 11.6 0.00 0.0 3.04 -0.3 
sec18 4.31 0.4 -5.8 2.7 1.82 -12.8 4.05 1.9 
sec19 0.00 -2.7 0.0 0.1 0.01 0.0 0.01 0.0 
sec20 0.60 1.4 -7.8 8.7 0.19 -8.8 7.11 0.9 
sec21 0.01 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.01 0.3 0.01 0.0 
sec22 1.06 1.4 4.3 9.7 0.06 3.3 0.16 6.7 
sec23 8.54 -1.4 4.9 -1.9 0.98 2.9 7.13 1.0 
sec24 1.10 2.9 33.6 11.3 1.00 13.1 0.23 8.5 
sec25 5.34 21.3 32.7 20.9 0.32 7.7 1.40 21.0 
sec26 0.20 -6.3 -2.9 10.0 0.01 -2.0 0.74 -5.3 
sec27 0.17 9.0 16.1 7.8 0.01 -10.1 0.87 8.0 
sec28 0.82 10.0 -9.8 2.5 29.57 19.8 0.18 1.3 
sec29 0.88 12.3 2.8 3.1 4.08 12.8 0.17 1.0 
sec30 11.30 38.4 -7.8 7.3 1.30 9.2 73.05 32.4 
sec31 0.01 1.9 7.1 3.4 0.01 -0.8 0.04 0.0 
sec32 0.06 0.6 -5.2 -8.3 0.01 -5.1 0.01 -3.9 
sec33 0.01 1.6 -8.7 1.5 0.01 -9.9 0.01 1.7 
sec34 0.61 4.2 0.1 2.4 0.01 -7.1 0.53 2.5 
Sec35 48.8 4.3 2.5 11.4 33.56 16.5 81.36 21.6 
Sec36 1.85 27.4 -8.4 11.4 0.76 11.4 0.16 13.5 
  
Notes :  
See Table A3 for definition of sectors 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
30 REFERENCES 
 
 30 
 
Table A2. Simulation results: Effects of tariff reduction on Uganda’s exports 
  
 Simulation 1: 100% reduction in EAC tariffs 
Simulation 2: 100% red in 
COMESA tariffs 
Simulation 3: 100% 
reduction in tariffs 
 Exports to EAC % change in exports to Exports to COMESA Exports to ROW 
 Base % change COMESA ROW Base % change Base % change 
sec1 0.08 17.67 4.9 -26.1 0.01 16.07 0.01 -26.5 
sec2 0.75 -9.7 8.8 3.6 0.01 -8.0 0.07 -1.0 
sec3 0.23 -4.8 -2.4 -8.7 0.01 -4.8 0.01 -9.4 
sec4 0.22 4.2 29.9 9.2 0.09 4.2 0.01 11.1 
sec5 4.42 -8.0 -24.0 4.8 3.96 -7.9 2.60 -5.7 
sec6 0.01 16.1 0.6 3.3 0.01 19.4 0.01 3.5 
sec7 0.92 35.4 5.5 6.6 2.78 35.0 0.29 7.9 
sec8 11.47 -1.1 35.0 15.4 0.78 -1.0 0.07 22.2 
sec9 1.08 7.7 15.8 -6.9 2.62 7.1 7.09 -6.0 
sec10 5.57 38.5 27.5 21.9 4.19 40.5 0.62 15.0 
sec11 0.47 11.1 29.9 21.7 0.14 12.1 0.12 13.8 
sec12 0.00 9.0 4.1 1.7 0.02 9.0 0.01 4.0 
sec13 0..06 3.9 2.3 8.1 0.01 3.0 0.01 10.6 
sec14 0.12 9.4 13.0 1.0 0.01 9.4 0.01 -1.2 
sec15 1.11 45.2 39.4 15.0 5.30 46.2 3.95 14.0 
sec16 0.85 39.2 1.5 17.3 0.37 39.4 0.03 16.9 
sec17 0.04 -5.0 -5.0 -1.0 0.11 -5.8 0.01 4.4 
sec18 2.56 10.3 24.3 -9.4 7.12 10.5 0.21 5.0 
sec19 0.01 0.0 0.9 -2.0 0.01 0.8 0.01 3.4 
sec20 5.21 -21.0 9.1 13.1 3.30 -1.0 0.48 11.1 
sec21 0.22 -6.6 -1.1 24.5 0.01 -4.9 0.05 21.2 
sec22 0.02 31.5 5.6 -7.2 0.05 29.5 0.02 -13.0 
sec23 2.55 8.2 -19.4 21.2 0.95 8.1 0.08 22.6 
sec24 0.07 29.6 12.2 7.5 0.43 29.8 0.24 5.8 
sec25 1.01 5.0 29.1 4.4 4.43 2.0 1.24 -16.1 
sec26 1.24 5.1 43.7 38.7 25.59 5.1 6.85 38.7 
sec27 34.20 38.8 33.4 15.9 0.01 38.7 0.80 10.9 
sec28 3.16 68.6 -9.3 30.5 7.11 55.1 1.06 29.9 
sec29 0.00 12.7  31.1 0.01 13.3 5.60 30.8 
sec30 5.34 32.1 9.1 -26.9 4.04 32.1 3.24 -6.7 
sec31 0.01 0.8 -1.2 -7.5 0.01 0.8 1.60 3.0 
sec32 0.42 -22.2 -9.0 13.5 0.01 -22.1 6.46 1.9 
sec33 0.01 0.9 3.4 2.2 0.03 0.1 3.43 1.9 
sec34 0.50 -33.3 4.1 -10.0 0.50 -9.6 3.56 -5.0 
Sec35 56.75 38.0 15.1 9.7 42.61 46.0 12.40 1.4 
Sec36 4.92 9.7 4.7 16.7 0.10 2.7 4.70 9.5 
 
Notes  
See Table A3 for definition of sectors 
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Table A3. Sectors included in the model , and substitution elasticities 
 
  Elasticity  1/  
Name used in 
GAMS code Meaning of the name 
Domestic/ imported 
(σD) 
Sourcing of imports 
(σM) 
Value-added 
(σVA) 
 
sec1 Live Animal 2.00  4.00  0.24   
sec2 Beef, other meat 3.85  7.70  1.12   
sec3 Poultry, poultry product  1.30  2.60  0.24   
sec4 Milk, diary  3.65  7.30  1.12   
sec5 Fish/fish products 1.25  2.50  0.20   
sec6 Potatoes 2.50  5.00  0.24   
sec7 Rice 2.60  5.20  1.12   
sec8 Maize  1.30  2.60  0.24   
sec9 Bread 2.00  4.00  1.12   
sec10 Cooking oil, oil seeds 3.30  6.60  1.12   
sec11 Fruits, fruit juice 1.85  3.70  0.24   
sec12 Ground nuts 2.45  4.90  0.24   
sec13 sesame 2.45  4.90  0.24   
sec14 Soy beans 2.45  4.90  0.24   
sec15 Sugar 2.70  5.40  1.12   
sec16 Wheat 4.45  8.90  0.24   
sec17 Sorghum 1.30  2.60  0.24   
sec18 Other cereals 1.30  2.60  0.24   
sec19 Cassava 2.50  5.00  0.24   
sec20 Vegetables 1.85  3.70  0.24   
sec21 Matooke/ other banana 1.85  3.70  0.24   
sec22 Spices 2.00  4.00  1.12   
sec23 Other foods 2.00  4.00  1.12   
sec24 Water 2.80  5.60  1.26   
sec25 Beverages 1.15  2.30  1.12   
sec26 Coffee 1.15  2.30  1.12   
sec27 Tea 1.15  2.30  1.12   
sec28 Tobacco 1.15  2.30  1.12   
sec29 Cocoa 3.25  6.50  0.24   
sec30 Cotton, textiles 3.75  7.50  1.26   
sec31 Flowers 3.25  6.50  0.24   
sec32 Hides & skins 4.05  8.10  1.26   
sec33 Vanilla 1.15  2.30  1.12   
sec34 Seeds 2.45  4.90  0.24   
Sec35 Manufactures  3.75  7.50  1.26   
Sec36 Other commodities 4.05  8.10  1.26   
      
 
Notes: 1/   Source:  GTAP Data Base - Dimaranam, B.V., McDoutall, and Hertel, T.W. Behavioral Parameters, GTAP Data Base.  
σD = Armington elasticity of substitution between domestic and imported goods 
σVA = Elasticity of substitution between primary factors in the production of commodity 
 
 
  
